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Abstract: The paper presents a framework for analysis of discourses on ethical cosmopolitanism, 
and applies it to Martha Nussbaum’s Frontiers of Justice (2006), with comparisons to the views of 
other authors. After outlining the book’s form of ethical cosmopolitanism, it considers the 
psychological, philosophical and sociological presumptions, the methodology of abstraction, the 
implicit audiences, and the programmatic targets and implied strategy of social change. It links 
and comments on sister papers by Giri, McCloskey, Murphy, Nederveen Pieterse and Truong. 
 
Questions about cosmopolitanism 
 
Cosmopolitanism—the idea that principles of human justice and ethics apply with 
global reach—has been a key theme in Martha Nussbaum’s work. For Love of Country 
(Cohen & Nussbaum 1996) criticised unbalanced patriotism in America and, a 
contributory factor, ignorance about most of the world. Cultivating Humanity (1997) 
looked at one response: innovative education in US universities about global-, gender- 
and racial differences and diversity. Its Chapter 2 was entitled ‘Citizens of the World’. 
Her new book Frontiers of Justice, based on the Tanner Lecture series Beyond the Social 
Contract, argues that there are basic weaknesses in a social contract approach, such as 
that of John Rawls, for it marginalizes or ignores the less-abled, the non-human, and the 
weak.  Chapters 4 and 5 elaborate this last concern with reference to the poor around the 
world, building a cosmopolitan stand. Chapter 5 concludes: 
If our world is to be a decent world in the future, we must acknowledge right now 
that we are citizens of one interdependent world, held together by mutual fellowship 
as well as the pursuit of mutual advantage, by compassion as well as self-interest, by 
a love of human dignity in all people, even when there is nothing we have to gain 
from cooperating with them. Or rather, even when what we have to gain is the 
biggest thing of all: participation in a just and morally decent world. (Nussbaum 2006: 
324)  
 The papers in this ‘Forum’ collection consider key issues in and around this sort of 
ethical cosmopolitanism, from a variety of social science angles. They stem from a March 
2006 workshop on ‘Cosmopolitanism: Exploring The Frontiers Of Justice’ held at the 
Institute of Social Studies in connection with award of an honorary doctorate to 
Nussbaum.  
 The papers take Nussbaum’s work as a major point of reference, notably Chapters 4 
and 5 of Frontiers of Justice (pp. 224-324) and the foundation chapter (pp. 9-95), but do 
not try to be reviews of the book. The papers’ roles are these. First, Jan Nederveen 
Pieterse characterises and situates the historic tradition of Western cosmopolitanism. He 
calls for attention to traditions of cosmopolitanism other than those of Western elites. 
Second, Thanh-Dam Truong critically assesses Nussbaum’s capabilities approach in 
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general, viewed through East Asian and feminist thought. 2 She advises that ‘a project 
for global justice [must] gain universal acceptance through inter-paradigmatic dialogues 
and mutual transformation, and therefore a vertical form of persuasion that can 
potentially eliminate cultural diversity must be avoided’. Shorter pieces by Deirdre 
McCloskey and John Cameron also evaluate the capabilities approach. McCloskey 
advises that the approach must consciously express an adequately broad picture of 
central human virtues, which she implies are universal; and Cameron suggests how to 
use with cosmopolitan sensitivity multiple listings of priority capabilities. Ananta Giri 
then links and extends the themes in Nederveen Pieterse and Truong, in an examination 
of contemporary ‘cosmopolitanization’ and Nussbaum’s work. He calls for multiple 
transformations in Western cosmopolitan discourses to make them more genuinely 
cosmopolitan, less Western parochial, and more aware of their requirements for 
cultural- and self-development. Lastly, Craig Murphy looks at the record of ‘dialogues 
and transformation’ in the international system over the past century, notably through 
the UN system in recent decades, and considers Nussbaum’s programmatic proposals. 
Martha Nussbaum’s own paper replies to the discussion. Amrita Chhacchi’s piece adds 
some final reflections.3 
 The purpose of the set is not to repeat the sort of treatment in a philosophy 
colloquium that would elaborate or refine or replace at the level of detail within Western 
academic normative philosophy. The intention is instead to contextualize, test, and 
perhaps extend or amend Nussbaum’s ideas, viewed from a range of social science 
perspectives. We have paid attention to one more type of frontier, that between 
intellectual disciplines. As formulated by Klamer and McCloskey (1989), intellectual 
divisions of labour are essential but yield their benefits only if accompanied by 
intellectual trade. The paper writers and discussants are prominent figures from various 
disciplines, each with strength in more than one and with a shared interest in human 
values and global relations.  
This overview paper investigates several of the key issues: 
 The question of who are the actors who are being discussed and/or addressed, in 
what geographical, organisational and intellectual milieux.  
 What are the sociological assumptions underlying discussions of ethics--whether 
cosmopolitan, contractualist or communitarian—the assumptions about the 
nature(s), contemporary and emergent, of personhood, identity, residence, and 
means of livelihood?  
 The fear that cosmopolitanism represents an agenda of metropolitan domination; 
versus the counterview that relativist stances offer less protection against 
metropolitan interventions and no basis from which to criticise them. 
 How well do academic debates connect to real institutions and movements 
beyond the academy? What are the assumptions or hypotheses about effective 
rhetorical strategies for influence and persuasion, for which audiences?   
 And what are the political and organizational assumptions about institutional 
frameworks and mechanisms, power, and effective strategies for change? 
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I begin, as background, with conceptual questions; introduce Nussbaum’s project in 
Frontiers of Justice; and then present the issues mentioned above. 
 
Concepts of cosmopolitanism 
 
Others have remarked that we seem to lack as yet an adequate well-established 
vocabulary for the territory. Here we are discussing ethical cosmopolitanism, views that 
one should relate ethically to people (from) around the world as equal fellow humans. 
We must distinguish it from three other concepts. Political cosmopolitanism concerns 
systems of power and authority, ‘a theory of world government and corresponding 
citizenship’ (Brennan 2001: 76). Cultural cosmopolitanism involves ‘an enthusiasm for 
customary differences, but as ethical or aesthetic material for a unified polychromatic 
culture’ (ibid.)). Sociological cosmopolitanism refers to high levels of mobility, cross-
cultural exposure and borrowing. Nederveen Pieterse’s paper gives a comparable 
breakdown of concepts, with more focus on practices than on ideas. 
Nussbaum is one advocate of an ethical cosmopolitanism consisting of in many 
respects equal treatment of people worldwide (universalist) plus substantive ethical 
obligations across national boundaries (solidarist), but not of a world state. She is, 
contrary to some fears, not a political cosmopolitan but in Timothy Brennan’s terms 
primarily an internationalist, ‘who does not quarrel with the principle of national 
sovereignty, for there is no other way under modern conditions to secure respect for 
weaker societies or peoples’ (Brennan 2001: 77). Her advocated ethical principles are 
advisory, with a few, unexceptional, exceptions (e.g. that genocide justifies international 
intervention). 
Not all universalist views are solidarist. Similarly, in Nederveen Pieterse’s terms, not 
all ethical cosmopolitanism is emancipatory. Lee Harris (Policy Review, no. 118, 2003) is 
one who suggests that Diogenes, creator of the term cosmopolitan, was a cynic with little 
concern for others. In Harris’ view, Diogenes’ famous phrase that he was a citizen of the 
world was a quip. Diogenes may have consistently held that he claimed no different 
rights for himself than for anyone else – only one, the right to be left alone. Marc Rich, 
the international speculator and market-fixer, claims only the same rights as he does for 
everyone: the right to buy whatever someone else agrees to sell and to sell whatever 
someone will buy (e.g., oil to apartheid South Africa, perhaps even a legal verdict, a 
human organ). He declares himself ‘a citizen of the world’ (cited in Gasper 2005, p.--). I 
argue elsewhere that: ‘We must not assume that views which accord low normative 
importance to national boundaries correlate strongly with views which grant high 
weight to the normative claims of people beyond those boundaries. Many national elites 
and other upwardly mobile groups seem de facto to reject both national and international 
moral community, except insofar as other people’s claims are heard through market 
signals. … We should reserve [the term] “cosmopolitan” (or “universalist”) for 
acceptance of the world as in important respects one moral domain, across which 
members have some obligations and rights; and use “solidaristic” for views in which 
such obligations and rights are relatively extensive… ‘ (Gasper 2005). In this overview 
paper however I will respect the entrenched predominant usage of (ethical) 
‘cosmopolitan’ as meaning both universalist and solidaristic.  
Membership of a global moral community can thus be variously construed. 
Nussbaum adopts what Charles Beitz perhaps oddly calls ‘liberal [ethical] 
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cosmopolitanism’, where the members are individual persons, not societies as in ‘social 
[ethical] cosmopolitanism’. Rawls was closer to the latter camp. Both positions stand in 
contrast with those which see international relations as beyond the realm of morality. 
Within ‘liberal cosmopolitanism’ itself, as we have seen not all strands are emancipatory; 
for example, arguably if the global moral principles are the laws of the free market. 
Brennan warns then that world government is not necessarily either egalitarian or 
solidaristic, and that neo-liberalism is the core of the most powerful present day global 
cosmopolitical community. Nederveen Pieterse’s paper presents a similar picture of a 
Western mainstream, in a historical trajectory ‘From Plato to NATO’. He contrasts that 
with other historical and contemporary strands, such as Islamic cosmopolitanisms and 
cosmopolitanisms of the poor. 
 
Nussbaum’s cosmopolitan project in Frontiers of Justice 
 
Nussbaum’s ethical cosmopolitanism itself is not new. What does Frontiers of Justice (FoJ) 
add for cosmopolitan theory?4 We can highlight four aspects.  
 First, the book’s unifying theme is the inability of social contract theory to give 
justice to weaker groups, even in its most evolved, Kantian version: John Rawls’s theory 
of justice. Frontiers of Justice is a bold critique of the work of perhaps the leading political 
philosopher of the late 20th century, the leader of its intellectual revival. Theoretical 
political philosophy and social ethics were depressed areas in mid-century, 
overwhelmed by the enormities of 20th century history, overshadowed by the 
achievements and norms of the natural sciences, and yet sheltered from pressure in 
affluent Western countries by their postwar socio-political settlements. At a time when 
the postwar settlements were beginning to fracture, Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) 
revived and transformed the intellectual terrain, in an extraordinary feat of sustained 
reflection that spanned numerous major issues in an integrated way. Its qualities, plus 
the fractures of opinion, fuelled an explosive revival of normative political philosophy. 
Rawls reinvigorated the social contract theory of justice, framing it so that the 
presumed bargainers would think more broadly than self-interest and the contract may 
be deemed fair. In his posited ‘original position’, the context for establishing a fair social 
contract, the bargainers do not know what will be their own social identity. They are 
therefore assumed to show prudential concern for the position of the least and less 
advantaged in the society whose rules they now set.  
Rawls’s theory of justice operates with a series of frontiers. First, an intra-societal 
frontier that separates the public realm, the realm of social justice, from the private 
world of the family. The assumption was queried by feminist philosophers, led by Susan 
Moller Okin. Also excluded are, secondly, the mentally handicapped, and thirdly, non-
human animals. Lastly, the theory remained intra-national. For Rawls, international 
justice was a matter of a fair contract between states, not a matter at the level of persons. 
He recognised a virtue of charity internationally to help destitute individuals, but did 
not accept it as a duty of justice, and instead developed a theory of the relations between 
states (or, in his term, ‘peoples’).   
These last three frontiers are taken up by Nussbaum in FoJ. Thus her title refers both 
to purported frontiers to justice and to frontiers of theory and debate. Just as feminists 
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have declared that the family is political and a realm for justice, so Nussbaum declares 
that the realm for justice extends in the three other directions too. She argues that even 
variants, such as those of Beitz and Pogge, which view the world as a single moral 
domain but which retain Rawls’s social contract perspective do not suffice for thinking 
about justice, because the relationships involved cannot be adequately conceived in 
terms of contracts between tolerably equal bargainers. 
 The book’s first key novelty then is its systematic critique of social contract theory 
(SCT). Secondly, and for cosmopolitanism very significant, the book represents an 
emphatic affiliation to the human rights approach, and a proffered basis for a rights 
approach. Thirdly, it provides a clearer exposition than before of Nussbaum’s switch, 
following Rawls, to a ‘political liberalism’, and her application of it directly at a global 
scale. Fourthly, it makes some programmatic suggestions; Nussbaum is clear though 
that this is where philosophers must hand over to other disciplines (p.307). 
 First, SCT, even in Rawls’s version(s), is argued to be inferior to a capabilities or 
natural rights approach, once we test it beyond its original territory of the mutual 
adjustment of a set of able and selfish contractors; for example when we apply it to a 
world scene of vast inequalities of power. FoJ contains major treatments of the rights of 
the disabled, the global poor, and of animals, though not of children. Even in its original 
territory, SCT’s assumptions are found to be problematic: that the contractors regulate 
only for themselves not others (or are taken to adequately represent the interests of those 
others),  value only their own concerns and advantage, not each others’, and are united 
in mutual disinterest. The conventional methodological justification for assumptions 
such as these, that are known to be unrealistic, is that if a just order can be founded even 
on pure self-concern then we can be truly confident of its sustainability. Nussbaum 
rejects this stance: ‘we cannot assume safely that if we get principles X and Y and Z out 
of prudence, then a richer moral starting point will give us X and Y and Z, plus more 
than that. For the richer moral starting point might actually cast doubt on X or Y, or 
suggest a wholly different way of thinking about society’ (2006: 56). Deirdre McCloskey 
calls this ‘the Nussbaum Lemma’.5 Nussbaum argues, following Grotius and indirectly 
the Stoics, that there is no good reason to exclude the basic human motivation for 
fellowship with others from the formulation of fundamental principles that will mould a 
theory of justice (ibid.: 37). In the international context the assumptions used in SCT 
become more problematic still: (often) that the sole relevant moral agents are states (or, 
in the later Rawls, ‘peoples’ who are strongly internally united by common sympathies); 
and that they are isolated, selfsufficient and roughly equal (p.231 ff.) 
 So this first feature of FoJ involves a central focus on a philosophical theory, 
Rawlsian social contract theory, which it finds deficient in terms of ability to handle 
three major ethical issues – disability, international justice, and animal rights; deficient 
as judged by our considered ethical intuitions and thus in terms of the criterion of 
reflective equilibrium. In particular, ‘Rawls’s theory of international justice neglects the 
inviolability of each person that is a key to Rawls’s domestic theory’ (p.253). This focus, 
in the first instance philosophical, leads to a discourse that remains moulded by Rawls, 
while trying to move beyond him bit by bit. It appears addressed primarily to Rawlsians 
and similar philosophical schools, and cannot move too far from their set of assumptions 
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for otherwise it will find that its audience has disappeared. 
 Second, FoJ makes clear that ‘the capabilities approach is one species of a human 
rights approach’ (p.7; see also pp. 78, 284), and that it builds on the Grotian ‘natural law’ 
tradition.6 We require ‘a conception of the purpose of social cooperation that focuses on 
fellowship as well as mutual advantage’ (p.227). Elsewhere ‘human respect’ is added to 
‘human fellowship’ (p.270), and in general FoJ speaks of human dignity. An adequate 
theory of justice does not come simply out of bargaining. Rights language appropriately 
conveys ‘urgent entitlements grounded in justice’ (p.290). 
 Besides affiliating itself, FoJ offers a theoretical base for international human rights, 
whose language has otherwise been dangerously obscure. Human rights are to be 
understood as corresponding to fundamental needs, namely the requisites of basic 
dignity, stated in the form of a set of capabilities (p. 284 ff.). A right must be fulfilled as a 
capability, not merely be not actively infringed. With such a grounding, rights can then, 
contrary to Onora O’Neill, give a more definite and more fundamental starting point 
than duties; for every notion of duty derives from a notion of need or entitlement, and 
basic needs are more clear than are the duties for helping to fulfil them (p.275 ff.). 
Nussbaum’s specificity on requisites, and limitation to the attainment of these basic 
thresholds, seems to her to provide a firmer foundation than does Sen’s ‘perspective of 
freedom’ and in addition to then leave more space for people to pursue their diverse 
conceptions of the good, not necessarily one of liberal autonomy (p.297). 
 Third, the later Rawls adopted a political form of liberalism, ‘political liberalism’, 
which starts from acknowledgement of many competing comprehensive conceptions of 
life which must be treated with respect. Rawls applied this domestically. So does 
Nussbaum in her reformulation since the late 1990s of her capabilities approach as a 
format for specifying priority requisites for dignity, up to ‘threshold levels’, as an area of 
necessarily implied consensus amongst the comprehensive conceptions. Nussbaum 
unlike Rawls now extends this ‘political liberalism’ to a global scale (p.299 ff.), to respect 
the inviolability and dignity of each person. This is still far from a comprehensive 
universal ethic or conception of flourishing (p.75), but she notes that the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was precisely such an exercise in political liberalism. By 
linking herself to the human rights movement, Nussbaum clarifies and strengthens her 
position in the politics of ethical discourse. In this context she presents her list of 
required capabilities less emphatically. It appears as one indicative part of an approach 
for thinking about the requisites of human dignity; which will be used in various ways 
in various places, rather than as if on tablets of stone. Many nations commit themselves 
to constitutions and bills of rights, but in each case somewhat differently and subject to 
evolution. 
 The fourth noteworthy aspect here in Frontiers of Justice is a set of suggestions on 
policy and practice. These will be outlined later, in the section ‘The politics of change’, 
and discussed in Craig Murphy’s paper. 
 
Cosmopolitan Presumptions – psychological, philosophical, and sociological  
 
Nussbaum lays out an eloquent, intricate appeal for cosmopolitan awareness and 
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cosmopolitan concern. What are her presumptions, and the presumptions needed for 
ethical cosmopolitanism? ‘To presume’, says the dictionary, is: 1. to take something for 
granted, assume; … 3. to rely or depend, … And ‘presumption’ means 1. the act of 
presuming, … 3. a belief or assumption based on reasonable evidence, 4. a ground or 
basis on which to presume.7 
 While Nussbaum addresses the limits of the social contract conception of justice, she 
recognises it as a sister approach, which can in part address the question of how ‘to 
solve the problems of global justice’ (Nussbaum 2004: 4) seen in particular as the 
massively unequal life chances of children. What, however, we must ask, of views which 
do not accept ‘children’, as opposed to ‘American children’ or ‘Dutch children’, as a 
relevant category, and thus which do not see this inequality as unjust? 
 
The presumed potential cosmopolitans 
 Nussbaum‘s work seeks to develop ‘a conception of the purpose of social co-
operation that focuses on fellowship as well as self-interest’ (2004: 4),  
‘[for] among the traits characteristic of the human being is an impelling desire for 
fellowship, that is for common life, not of just any kind, but a peaceful life, and organized 
according to the measure of his intelligence, with those who are of his kind’ (Grotius, On 
The Law of War and Peace, cited by Nussbaum 2006: 36).  
Nussbaum stresses that people are not asocial bargainers, but moral social creatures. But 
the sociability is as part of a society, a group – ‘with those who are of his kind’ as 
Grotius observed. How far does and can that extend globally? Is ‘fellowship’ cosmic in 
scale? Ranged against Nussbaum, in David Harvey’s words, are ‘all manner of 
hyphenated versions of cosmopolitanism, variously described as rooted, situated, 
vernacular [etc. etc.] … in the  belief that detached loyalty to the abstract category of “the 
human” is incapable in theory, let alone in practice, of providing any kind of political 
purchase...’ (Harvey 2001: 530). 
"What I'm wrestling with now," Ms. Nussbaum says, "is the problem of being a Stoic 
cosmopolitan with a non-Stoic set of attachments. The ideal of feeling equal concern for 
all humanity seems to me good and right. But the Stoic approach, which involves pruning 
away one's attachment to the local, is too surgical. Marcus Aurelius writes about trying to 
overcome one's feelings at the death of a child. It's an effort to become invulnerable, and 
it doesn't offer a sense of life that is rich enough to be worth living." … 
Human relationships form a series of concentric circles [as she stresses, 
following the Stoics], and our emotions are inescapably conditioned by that fact. The 
capacity for empathy is strongest with people who are already close. It can still be very 
intense for people we already share something with, even if we don't know them 
personally. And it tends to become more abstract the further one gets from the sphere of 
"me and mine." How, then, to accept both the rootedness of emotion in local situations 
and a feeling of global responsibility?  It is by no means a rhetorical question. "I think the 
challenge is to build concentricity in a way that really does extend outward," says Ms. 
Nussbaum, "rather than drawing the line somewhere, so that you demonize those who are 
outside that boundary." (McLemee, 2001) 
 The Stoics’ conception of concentric circles already contains, visually, the potential 
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for a rooted cosmopolitanism. How to build it? Truong and especially Giri consider the 
potentials and paths of culturally and spiritually grounded ‘emergent multiversality’. 
Rather than relying solely on a universe-spanning emotional bond, as in a stress on  
membership of the human family, we may also build in the same way as we build other 
things, by connecting one thing to another to another, connecting persons and their 
concerns to and through systems of institutions. Such building is a very long-term 
process, but historically clearly underway, and linked to the growing interconnections 
across our cosmos.  
 
Presumptions about the cosmos: a world of interconnection 
 Onora O’Neill has powerfully argued (1996, 2000) that the presumptions that we in 
our daily business make about other people around the world with whom we interact –  
presumptions that they are separate creatures with definite but limited powers – have an 
ethical implication. She highlights three presumptions: ‘[1. ‘plurality’] that there are others 
(seen as separate from the agent); [2. ‘connection’] that those others are nevertheless connected 
to the agent (either or both can act on the other); and [3. ‘finitude’, or, alternatively put, 
agency and vulnerability] that those others have limited but determinate powers’ (1996: 101; 
emphases in the original). Our actions can imply these presumptions, that ‘others are 
agents and subjects’ (p.101), even if we consciously deny the propositions. We cannot 
make these presumptions during our pragmatic and prudential interactions and 
transactions and then erase the presumptions during discussion of our ethical 
interconnections, our mutual obligations and rights: ‘What is assumed for purposes of 
activity [e.g. trade] must also be assumed in fixing the scope of ethical consideration’ (O’Neill, 
1996: 106; my addition). This is an example of a line of argument which proffers a 
philosophical presumption for a form of  ethical cosmopolitanism. 
 O’Neill’s argument relies on, and its scope varies according to, the facts of global 
interaction and transaction. Correspondingly, different realities and interpretations of 
cross-global interaction may bring different stances on cosmopolitanism.8 So different 
sociological conceptions or presumptions of current and emerging patterns of cross-
global interaction sustain different conceptions of cross-global ethics. Communit-
arianism—positions that ethics are, should and must be rooted in strong communities 
(whether local, tribal, or, less plausibly, national)—has been widely and powerfully 
criticized for resting on weak and dated sociology.9 We must give cosmopolitanism 
equally searching sociological examination. What, for example, do the poor and 
insecure, and the ‘transplanted hearts’ in the globalized care industry, think of 
cosmopolitanism? 
 Truong expresses a concern that Nussbaum’s project to extend ‘political liberalism’ 
to a global scale could be a more tendentious and fraught exercise than Nussbaum 
imagines. She doubts any appeal to a supposedly universalisable intuition, even seen as 
a longterm appeal to an eventual well informed and well reflected intuition under 
uncoerced circumstances. Truong evokes the contrast between a notion of one ethical 
universe and the notion of ethical 'multiverse'. The latter rests on a differentiated social 
ontology that takes into account the socially embedded human and the universe she/he 
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produces. In this latter position, each ethical(/social) universe has its own distinctive 
internal logic but can relate to the others in a constructive way. They don't replace each 
other, but are adjunct to each other and serve to interrogate each other's conduct.  
 Michael Walzer amongst others has argued that a sociologically grounded ethics 
recognizes the actual and necessary existence of numerous distinct ‘Spheres of Justice’ 
within each society (e.g. those of markets, the state, families, education, and more). 
Internationally he propounds a further distinction, between the ‘thick’ ethical discourses 
in these domestic spheres and the ‘thinness’ of cross-national ethical discourse. Critics 
have proposed that his picture of lifeworlds is incomplete and that a domestic-
international dichotomy is misleading. It understates both the universalist languages 
that modern moral and political debates employ as standard ‘product of societies which 
have become rationalized and differentiated’ (Rustin 1995: 38), and the realities of 
extensive global interconnection. From detailed consideration of the diverse modern-day 
interconnections, David Held (2004) and others see not a system of block-like nation-
states – certainly not even the United States, India or China is a self-contained world – 
but a world system of innumerable overlapping communities. As in Toni Erskine (2001)’s 
‘embedded cosmopolitanism’, an inclusive ethic can therefore arise because individuals 
are simultaneously members of many, overlapping, non-territorial, morally constitutive 
communities (Gasper 2005). We need images of overlapping circles, not only of 
concentric ones. 
 
Rhetorics in relation to audiences and contexts 
 
Some recurrent concerns arise as Nussbaum tries to lead her philosopher peers (and 
economist and other associates) towards richer conceptions of human personality and 
obligations. First, to have a conversation with the analytical philosophers, her style 
remains relatively abstract; whereas to have credibility in most of social science and the 
humanities, especially on a topic like cosmopolitanism, one should display detailed and 
copious grounding in diverse, intricate and recherche realities. Second, concerning this 
abstracted generalized language in which an aspirant ‘truth speaks to power’, critics 
apparently fear that too narrow a truth has too direct an access to too narrow and great a 
power – despite or even because of Nussbaum’s affiliation to the human rights and 
human development agendas of the United Nations and very distinctly not to the 
agendas of the American state. 
 
Which abstractions when? 
 ‘Theories of social justice should be abstract’, relevant and justifiable for a range of 
situations, insists Nussbaum in the opening sentence of FoJ. ‘On the other hand, theories 
of social justice should also be responsive to the world and its most urgent problems’ 
(2006: 1), which the book manifestly attempts. Yet to social science readers its chapters 
on international justice contain rather little of the realities of international relations in the 
modern world. That knowledge remains tacit or peripheral, used in initial motivation 
and briefly in Ch.5’s final section on ‘Ten Principles for the Global Structure’. The 
discomfort that social scientists feel here, reflected especially in the papers by Nederveen 
Pieterse and Truong, may be more acute in response to FoJ—a conversation with Rawls 
on his terrain of philosophical ethics—than for more case-grounded works like 
Cultivating Humanity or Women and Human Development. 
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 Onora O’Neill addresses the issue of abstraction and realism in a theory of justice, as 
follows (1992, 1996, 2000). We must abstract from irrelevant differences (e.g., sometimes, 
gender); though which differences are irrelevant can depend on the situation. And we 
must include relevant differences (e.g., sometimes, gender); again which are relevant 
will depend on the situation. Thus we must aim for abstraction without idealization, and 
context-sensitivity without a pure relativism that re-endorses whatever exists (Gasper 
1996). Our picture of when a difference is relevant is built up through examination and 
debate on cases in the light of principles and debate on principles in the light of cases. 
This dialectic is seen throughout Nussbaum’s oeuvre, including in FoJ, though more in 
the chapters on disability than those on on international relations. 
 McCloskey suggests that Nussbaum abstracts too much and does not follow through 
her own ‘Lemma’: a perspective of a range of central human virtues cannot be produced 
from a discourse that sees people more narrowly; parsimony here is wrong. Nussbaum 
has written extensively elsewhere on such virtues, but aims in FoJ to maintain a 
conversation with contractarians. 10 The lesson, perhaps, is to be more explicit on which 
abstractions one is making when and why. 
 
We are the world? 
 Nussbaum recurrently arouses a reaction that her cosmopolitan view is an attempt 
to dictate to others. Who is the ‘we’ in the following passage? ‘It is not by polling people 
and asking what they currently prefer that we reach this conclusion [that equal access to 
primary and secondary education is a fundamental human entitlement], for existing 
preferences about matters of education (especially, perhaps, women’s preferences) are 
frequently deformed…’ (Nussbaum, FoJ, p.279). This could be read as no longer the 
authorial ‘we’ but as a peer group of already educated governors. 
 There is an unavoidable (but tolerable) paradox, pointed to by Truong and 
Nederveen Pieterse, in liberalism’s insistence that persons should have the chance to opt 
out of any given cultural framework except for this one. The illiberality involved 
certainly appears less however than that in cultural and policy frameworks which 
enforce single options and do not allow anyone to opt out, even though he or she wishes 
to, into a system which provides choices. The liberal principle allows persons to adopt 
their own lifestyle but not to prevent others doing the same. 
 Nussbaum always stresses numerous and major provisions for pluralism, flexibility 
and context-sensitivity in her theory, including not least that it is only advice (see e.g. 
FoJ, pp. 78-80, 256-7). Presentation of a viewpoint is not dictation; the fierce reaction by 
some readers suggests that they fear though that some of the audience will accept 
Nussbaum’s viewpoint. If no aspirant truths can be voiced, the reaction will have 
blocked the dialogical approach that it supposedly advocates and it can implicitly 
become a defence of power, of existing elites.  
 The fear is partly grounded in histories of imperialism. Brennan, for one, sometimes 
reduces cosmopolitanism to this single variety: ‘It is a discourse of the universal that is 
inherently local—a locality that’s always surreptitiously imperial. … Typically, 
cosmopolitanism constructs political utopias in aesthetic or ethical guise, so that they 
may more effectively play what often proves, on inspection, to be ultimately an 
                                                   
10 The cognitive linguist George Lakoff warns though: ‘If you keep their language and their framing and just 
argue against it, you lose because you are reinforcing their frame’ (2004: 33). 
 11 
economic role’ (Brennan 2001: 81). Harvey raises a related query: ‘What if Heidegger is 
right in insisting that Kant’s cosmopolitanism inevitably slips into an internationalism 
rooted in nationalism?’ (Harvey 2000: 546). But he sees a richer picture of varieties than 
does Brennan, since, comparably, he ‘sees capitalism as a much more uneven, 
variegated, amoebic, and anarchic process’ (Gidwani 2006: 16). 
 Who then are the potential audience? Nussbaum’s theory could be used in various 
ways. As an American she might influence bodies in America about what they support 
or don’t support internationally. As an international figure she might perhaps have 
influence in international bodies, such as UNDP, about what they promote or don’t 
promote. As an intellectual she might influence people around the world, who then in 
turn might influence official bodies. In each case one might hold that primary 
responsibility for use of her ideas would lie with whichever bodies adopt them.  
 Nussbaum’s discursive strategy arouses fears of Northern dominance, or at least of 
dominance of the wrong sort of Northerners (ignorant, already too powerful, 
wrongheaded), and of a privileged access to trigger-happy metropolitan elites--or at 
least of misuse by them of well-intentioned abstracted ideas. How will her clearer 
affiliation now with human rights affect this perception?  
 International human rights (IHRs) were not explicitly theorised when adopted in the 
1940s, other than to say that they were compatible with many traditions. Their central 
location of exposition was the United States, arguably as part of anti-Communism as 
well as post-Nazism. Why would one now bother to theorise human rights further? A 
significant difference from the 1940s is that powerful forces in US political culture have 
since then failed to accept and adopt the IHR regime; they have their own version of 
rights, vision of the good life and project for the world. As Murphy’s paper notes, this 
US mainstream rejects the idea of international obligations (other than, usually, contract 
observance), though it periodically considers that it knows what is best for everyone and 
may choose to enforce it. A central audience implied then in Nussbaum’s work is not 
only academic philosophers but, as seen in her chosen style and outreach, a wider 
American public.11 Her sustained sophisticated address of an American public on 
themes of cosmopolitanism, human rights and human development is a major 
contribution. This only worries some critics all the more, who fear American plans for 
the world.  
 
America and other audiences  
Arguably the most important audience (set of audiences) for a cosmopolitan 
discourse lies in the US, given both its power and its insularity. Nussbaum has in many 
ways primarily focused on this audience – through her examples, her debating targets, 
and the ‘we’ to whom she sometimes appeals. A question arises: what forms of focus 
and of rhetorical strategy are in fact likely to have much effect with this audience? On 
the one hand, Nussbaum’s work on global justice, care and emotions aims to contribute 
to long-term shifts, via influencing legal systems, education curricula and professional 
formation. It is not to be assessed as a weapon in short-term Washington DC political 
debates, where one might expect it to have no influence. But for the long haul, what 
                                                   
11So sometimes her ‘we’ means the USA. One example (in a section on US aid) is: ‘To the extent that a nation 
fails to endorse such goals [as female empowerment and equality] publicly and constitutionally, we would 
be right to proceed in a more cautious way, but we should probably still be entitled to focus aid on projects 
that seem to us morally good’ (p.261). 
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methods might be effective? American powerholders emphasise the languages of 
freedom, choice and self-fulfilment (and of ‘home’ and ‘security’). Sen in ‘Development 
as Freedom’ (1999) adopted a language that may appeal to an American mainstream 
audience, as well as diverse groups elsewhere. Haq in the Human Development Reports 
found a ‘human’ rhetoric that is equally global but less American, and Nussbaum 
appears closer to this. We look further at this question of methods later when referring 
to change strategies. 
 A second question: what sorts of discourse are relevant in other contexts? In national 
and international policy contexts, cosmopolitan perspectives are relevant in debates on 
trade, aid, relief, immigration, multi-culturalism, global governance, the UN system, and 
so on. They figure in academic debates against IR ‘realism’ when that presents itself as 
an ethical stance, and in legal disputes such as on the reach of human rights law. But 
each context has its own requirements, for certain types of depth and background, to 
which FoJ is not oriented. For example, at a recent conference on the Earth Charter the 
following sort of advice was repeatedly voiced: ‘Only if this language is connected to 
that of religion and/or local culture can I do anything with it in my country’. David 
Held’s Global Covenant in contrast to Frontiers of Justice immerses itself in fully briefed 
reference to the in-agendas, in-terms, and recent bureaucratic products of global 
governance, and provides a much more elaborate practical programme.12 Murphy 
suspects that Held’s cosmopolitan democracy project itself appeals to radicals in rich 
countries but will not in our lifetimes interest the emergent nations (2005: 59, 172-4). 
Nussbaum’s FoJ appears attuned rather, and understandably, to two main audiences: 
philosophers, and a general Northern (but especially American) audience of potentially 
sympathetic students and intellectuals, the audience whose liberal education she 
discussed in Cultivating Humanity. 
 
The politics of change 
 
Practical and useful institutional and policy goals? 
Nussbaum, like most contemporary cosmopolitans, is no advocate of a world state, 
since it is ‘very unlikely to have a decent level of accountability to its citizens’ and if it 
‘should become unjust there would be no corresponding recourse’ to external aid (2006: 
313). Local sovereignty has a moral value too: it means that people give themselves laws. 
Hence ‘the institutional structure at the global level ought to remain thin and 
decentralized’ (p.314). She then suggests a set of ten principles for this global structure 
(pp. 315-323): 
1. ‘Overdetermination of responsibility: the domestic never escapes it’ (p.315) 
2. National sovereignty, ‘except in a limited range of circumstances’ (p.316) 
3. A duty of rich nations to give a lot (more) 
4. MNC duties to invest socially and promote human capabilities where they work, 
and to promote ‘good labour conditions’ (p.318) 
5. A fair global economic system, not the present one 
6. ‘a thin decentralized, and yet forceful global public sphere’ (p. 318): including 
e.g. some limited forms of global taxation, the world criminal court, world 
                                                   
12 Held’s use of the language of ‘covenant’ matches Nussbaum’s Grotian approach rather than social 
contract theory. 
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environmental regulations, global labor standards. 
7. International pressure in favour of the disadvantaged within national 
jurisdictions 
8. Care for the weak, ‘the ill, the elderly, children and the disabled’, as a global 
priority, not only placing all the burden on women family members 
9. The family as precious, but not sacrosanct (e.g., not free to neglect girls) 
10. All parties must support education, ‘as a key to the empowerment of currently 
disadvantaged people’. 
‘The allocation [of duties here] is an ethical allocation, …: there is no coercive structure 
over the whole that would enforce on any given part a definite set of tasks.’ (Nussbaum 
2006: 315). 
 Perhaps unwisely, Nussbaum refers for the third principle to ‘the figure of 2 percent 
of GDP…[as] a good sign of what might begin to be morally adequate’ (p.317), rather 
than focusing on feature 5, a fair global economic system, and on the issue of what level 
of support would be required to meet basic capabilities, which very likely is far lower 
than two per cent if combined with a fair global economic system. Murphy notes though 
that a two per cent figure dates from advice by Arthur Lewis and the Chicago economist 
TW Schultz after the Second World War -- during a period of some even larger transfers 
than 2 per cent by the then much less affluent US through the Marshall Plan to European 
recipients who were much richer than presentday LDCs. 
 A fair global economic system may be the central issue. Nederveen Pieterse stresses 
that emancipatory globalization equals the re-regulation and counterbalancing of 
corporate-led globalization. Zoya Hasan of Jawaharlal Nehru University wonders then 
whether the fifth and sixth principles are compatible:  
Nussbaum proposes a thin and decentralized institutional structure at the global level. It 
consists of the domestic structures of rich nations, which have responsibilities for 
redistributing some of their wealth to other nations, and multinationals, international 
bodies and the NGOs [which] take some responsibility for promoting capabilities. In 
fairness they must bear a proportional burden. However, corporate globalization is 
fundamentally a centralizing tendency drawing disparate economies and sectors into a 
world controlled by a few decision makers. These are the IMF, World Bank, the WTO, 
which act on behalf of banks and bondholders, and rich countries and rich elites more 
generally, in preference to that of workers, peasants and other poor people and nations. 
One wonders whether there is room for decentralized governance in this system in the 
absence of radical restructuring. Global justice most urgently needs a proper and 
internationally accountable multilateral system, as what these institutions and 
multinational companies are undermining is democracy…13 
Murphy’s paper shares Hasan’s concern. He adds though that in the complex and subtle 
task of finding a politically feasible path forward, Nussbaum’s muted yet deeply rooted 
idealism might still support a worthwhile middle way.  
 The ten principles appear as a sort of afterword, without great emphasis from 
Nussbaum, who rightly judges that this is the point where the philosopher must hand 
over to the practitioner and the social scientist. Murphy refines some of her suggestions. 
He, Nederveen Pieterse, Truong and Giri also look in a broader way at possible 
historical agents and paths of change. Let us consider then, in conclusion, the associated 
                                                   
13 Zoya Hasan of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, in a presentation on Nussbaum’s 2002 
Tanner lectures.  
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general perspectives on how social change can happen. 
 
Change strategies? 
 What assumptions, explicit and implicit, are made in cosmopolitan discussions 
about possible paths towards change? Some possible hypotheses might be, for example: 
educationvalue-changepressureaction;14 or, more specifically, that the philosopher 
sows seeds and civil society spreads and cultivates them and applies pressure to 
decision-makers. The Great Transition scenario of a world transition to sustainable 
development, for example, envisages eventual value change led by civil society, and 
specifically led by the young (Raskin et al. 2002). How cogent are the assumptions made, 
and what consistency exists between the actual focus of work on cosmopolitanism and 
any ideas about paths of change?  
 Nussbaum is clear and forceful on the general significance of value-ideas: ‘There is 
perhaps nothing more urgent, in a world increasingly driven by multinational 
corporations and the power motive that is built into their operations, than to articulate a 
set of humanly rich goals for development, and a set of more general attitudes about the 
purposes of cooperation…’ (2006: 306). Truong and Giri wonder whether Nussbaum 
goes far enough concerning the scope, content, and possible spiritual basis for the value 
changes required, including in understanding of the sources of compassion and 
fellowship. Further, with Nederveen Pieterse and Murphy they reflect on the social 
bases for cosmopolitanism: ‘cosmopolitanism from above is empty without 
cosmopolitanism from below, without the actual experience of world citizenship’ or 
fellowship (Nederveen Pieterse, p.7). David Harvey has warned that it is not so much 
empty as dangerous: 
‘…if Nussbaum’s cosmopolitanism is to become anything other than a pious hope, 
nothing short of a modern-day (Alexander) Humboldtian synthesis will do. … 
Cosmopolitanism, in short, is empty without its cosmos. … [and] a more unified critical 
geographical understanding of the world to parallel the contemporary striving for a 
cosmopolitan ethic’ [and counteract the trivialization and demonization of regions that 
metropolitan powers wish to control]. ‘Cosmopolitanism bereft of geographical 
specificity remains abstracted and alienated reason, liable, when it comes to earth, to 
produce all manner of unintended and sometimes explosively evil consequences.  … 
there can be no universality without particularity and vice versa …’ (Harvey 2000: 554-5, 
557, 560). 
In the spirit of Nussbaum’s earlier study Cultivating Humanity, on which he was 
commenting, he stressed: ‘To pretend, then, that we have to make some choice between 
“universal” and “rooted” cosmopolitanism…is a false characterization’ (Harvey 2000: 
559). However, he added, ‘The geographical point is not to reject cosmopolitanism but to 
ground it in a dynamics of historical-geographical transformation’ (loc. cit.). 
 A cosmopolitanism that seeks change should understand itself as an historical 
product in a geopolitical setting. Nederveen Pieterse, Truong and Giri together suggest 
that counterbalancing corporate cosmopolitanization will require richer cultural and 
                                                   
14 The policy agenda enunciated by the UN’s Commission for Human Security (the Ogata-Sen commission) 
in its report Human Security Now (2003) includes cosmopolitan education that can ‘teach students to reason, 
to consider ethical claims, to understand and work with such fundamental ideas as human rights, human 
diversity and interdependence …’ (CHS, 2003: 122). It covers ‘opening up of perceptions of identity, to see 
oneself as having multiple identities (p.123), and ‘Clarifying the need for a global human identity’ (pp. 141-
2), in addition to the awareness and respect for profound diversity. See also Oxfam (2006). 
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historical perspectives than from the traditions of Western normative philosophy alone. 
And while they may share the vision that the theorist sows seeds of which some can fall 
upon fertile soil, much of their other work examines specific social movements that 
adopt, carry, use, and transform ideas.  
 Recent work on leadership through ideas in the world system (including: Emmerij, 
Jolly and Weiss 2001, 2005; Murphy 2005, 2006) concludes that indeed amongst the key 
ideas with societal influence are ideas about values. As a key example: ‘UN ideas can 
change the nature of international public policy discourse and debate and, as a result, 
can often help states to define or redefine their interests to be more inclusive of common 
concerns’ (Emmerij et al. 2005: 218).  However, de Bono (1985) notes that it may be 
easier, relatively speaking, to influence people by changing visions than by directly 
changing their values. Further, ideas about values may have little sustained impact if not 
embodied in practical methodologies and proposals that convey and channel a way of 
seeing, a vision. Individual value change is not sufficient or the end in itself, but 
complementary and supportive to the establishment of human rights standards, other 
standards, and countervailing forces against powers of privilege, based in strong 
organizations. 
Murphy has specialized on what brings changes in the realm of international 
organisations, and his paper summarises some of the key findings. Concrete practical 
proposals that embody values and visions have to be placed in the public arena, 
accessible to potentially interested reformers who may then pick them up for reasons of 
their own (see Murphy’s paper; and, for details, Murphy 2005; also Hirschman 1973). 
Drawing on evidence from 150 years of the evolution of global institutions, Murphy 
argues that at certain moments system managers need new ideas to resolve conflicts and 
they then look around. For justice-oriented groups to make a difference they must:  keep 
active contact and cooperation with progressive segments in ruling groups and 
international organizations; maintain a transnational network – to share and build ideas, 
provide mutual support and lobbying, and offer sanctuary when needed; and have lots 
of ideas and proposals ready. Thomas Pogge is one current example of a philosopher 
who has internalized such advice and seeks to connect a rethinking of justice to the 
energy of social movements. Martha Nussbaum’s writings are a leading contribution to 
such rethinking, that help to inspire the required energy and movement. 
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